Did you know that there is no uniform juvenile justice system in the United States? It is quite surprising. Matters concerning minors and children who break the law are left to the discretion of individual states and their legislative bodies. States have different priorities, and legislators enact new laws and revise legislation according to their own needs at the time. Although every state operates independently, they manifest common trends and respond to certain issues in a similar manner. For example, the increasing fear of youth violence in the 1990s precipitated more specific and punitive legislation in almost every state (Feld, 2003). Some states with very specific and real gang problems devised targeted gang suppression laws and legislation, while other states did not. The fear of youth crime led states to create mandatory minimum legislation (like Measure 11 laws in Oregon), waiver and transfer laws, and zero-tolerance policies.

The juvenile justice system has two main responsibilities: to oversee cases involving (1) juvenile delinquency (criminal law violations and status offenses) and (2) dependency, neglect, and child abuse (Rubin, 1996). Due to the loose definitions of parens patriae and the court’s attempt to act in the best interest of the child, after World War II, the juvenile court was criticized for disregarding due process.

Due process refers to the procedural rights established in the Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights. It includes rights such as the right to legal counsel, the right to call witnesses, and the right to be notified of charges (which will be revisited in In re Gault). The original juvenile court did not implement due process rights because it was intervening in the lives of youth for their own good, not in such a formalized adult way that they would need constitutional protections. However, because of the abuse of power, this changed in later decades.

Beginning in the 1960s, four areas drastically changed in the juvenile court:

1. The juvenile due process revolution from 1966 to 1975.
2. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.
3. A growing emphasis on punishment and accountability in the 1980s and 1990s.
4. Contemporary juvenile justice reform that is driven by evidence-based practices and empirical research on adolescent development, which in turn leads us back to rehabilitation.

10.5.1 Due Process in the Juvenile Court

As discussed, the juvenile court was created with rehabilitation and individualized treatment in mind. However, between 1966 and 1975, the court became more formalized and started “adultifying” the process. Landmark cases for establishing due process rights in the juvenile justice system include:

10.5.1.1 Kent v. United States (1966)

Kent v. United States (1966)

Morris Kent was a 16-year-old boy living in Washington DC who was on probation for burglary and theft. He was arrested again and charged with three burglaries, three robberies, and two counts of rape. Due to the seriousness of the changes and Kent’s previous criminal history, the prosecutors moved to try Kent in adult court. However, because of his age, he was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Kent’s lawyers wanted his case to be heard in juvenile court. The judge sided with the prosecutors without a hearing or a full investigation, and Kent was tried in adult court. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30–90 years in prison. On appeal, Kent’s lawyers argued that the case should have to stay in juvenile court, and was unfairly moved to adult court without a proper hearing.

The Supreme Court ruled that while minors can be tried in adult court, the original judge needed to conduct a full investigation and an official waiver hearing where the merits of the case were weighed, such as the juvenile’s age, prior charges, and mental state. Kent was entitled to a hearing that provided “the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” This standard includes the right to a formal hearing on the motion of waiver and a written statement of the reasons for a waiver, the right to counsel, and the defense’s access to all records involved in the waiver decision. It also ruled that “The parens patriae philosophy of the Juvenile Court ‘is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness” (Kent, 1966).

10.5.1.2 In re Gault (1967)

In re Gault (1967)

Gerald “Jerry” Gault, a 15-year-old Arizona boy, was taken into custody for making obscene calls to a neighbor’s house. After the neighbor, Mrs. Cook, filed charges, Gault and his friend were taken to the Juvenile Detention Home. When he was taken into custody, his parents were at work, and the arresting officers made no effort to contact them, nor did they leave a note about the arrest or where they were taking their son. They finally learned of his whereabouts from the family of the friend who was arrested with him.

When the habeas corpus hearing was held two months later, Mrs. Cook was not present, no one was sworn in before testifying, and no notes were taken. He was released and scheduled to reappear a few months later for an adjudication hearing. In the following hearing, again, Mrs. Cook was not present, and no official transcripts of the proceeding were taken.

The official charge was “making lewd phone calls.” The maximum penalty for an adult charge with this was a $50 fine or not more than two months in jail. Gault was found guilty and sentenced to six years in juvenile detention.

Gault’s parents filed a writ of habeas corpus, which was eventually heard by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that juveniles are entitled to due process rights when the court proceedings may result in confinement to a secure facility. The specific due process rights highlighted in this case include (1) fair notice of charges; (2) right to counsel; (3) right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and (4) privilege against self-incrimination.

The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to juvenile and adult defendants. “Juvenile court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.” (In re Gault, 1967).

10.5.1.3 In re Winship (1970)

In re Winship (1970

Samuel Winship, a 12-year-old boy living in New York, was charged with stealing $112 from a woman’s purse in a store, a charge that “if done by an adult would constitute the crime or crimes of Larceny.” Since he committed a crime, the charges of juvenile delinquency were justified. Winship was found delinquent in a New York juvenile court, using the civil law standard of proof, “preponderance of the evidence.” Winship was committed to a state training school for an initial period of 18 months with an annual extension of no more than six years.

Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Winship, 1970). The court acknowledged that juvenile proceedings are designed to be more informal than adult proceedings. Still, if charged with a crime, the juvenile is granted protection of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship expanded the constitutional protections established in Gault.

10.5.1.4 Breed v. Jones (1975)

Breed v. Jones (1975)

A 17-year-old boy named Gary Jones was charged with armed robbery and found guilty in a California juvenile court. At the dispositional hearing, the probation officer assigned to the case testified that Jones was not amenable to treatment. After the hearing, the court determined that Jones should subsequently be tried as an adult. Jones’ lawyers filed a writ of habeas corpus. They argued that waiving the case to adult court after it was already adjudicated in juvenile court violated the double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled that, yes, Jones had been placed in double jeopardy. This further formalized the juvenile court. However, the court moved, “Giving respondent the constitutional protection against multiple trials in this context will not, as petitioner claims, diminish the flexibility and informality of juvenile-court proceedings” (Raley, 1995).

10.5.2 The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974 reformed and redefined the philosophy, authority, and procedures of the juvenile justice system in the United States. This was the first major federal initiative to address juvenile delinquency nationwide (OJJDP, 1998). While historically, the oversight of juvenile matters fell on the states, the JJDP Act established some oversight at the federal level.

The JJDP Act attached to state funding to reform efforts. For example, one major reform effort involved revising policies around secure detention, separating juveniles from adult offenders, and deinstitutionalizing status offenders. Status offenders were no longer to be held in secure facilities with delinquent youth (OJJDP, 1998). In 1992, as part of the reauthorization of JJDPA, states were encouraged to identify gaps in their ability to provide appropriate services for female juvenile delinquents (42 U.S.C. 5601; OJJDP). The federal government expected states to provide specific services for the prevention and treatment of female delinquency and prohibit gender bias in the placement, treatment, and programming of female delinquents.